Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2016/886

A Robust and Sponge-Like PRNG with Improved Efficiency

Daniel Hutchinson

Abstract: Ever since Keccak won the SHA3 competition, sponge-based constructions are being suggested for many different applications, including pseudo-random number generators (PRNGs). Sponges are very desirable, being well studied, increasingly efficient to implement and simplistic in their design. The initial construction of a sponge-based PRNG (Bertoni et al. CHES 2010) based its security on the well known sponge indifferentiability proof in the random permutation model and provided no forward security.

Since then, another improved sponge-based PRNG has been put forward by Gaži and Tessaro (Eurocrypt 2016) who point out the necessity for a public seed to prevent an adversarial sampler from gaining non-negligible advantage. The authors further update the security model of Dodis et al. (CCS 2013) to accommodate a public random permutation, modelled in the ideal cipher model, and how this affects the notions of security.

In this paper we introduce \reverie, an improved and practical, sponge-like pseudo-random number generator together with a formal security analysis in the PRNG with input security model of Dodis et al. with the modifications of the Gaži and Tessaro paper.

We prove that \reverie is \emph{robust} when used with a public random permutation; robustness is the strongest notion of security in the chosen security model. Robustness is proved by establishing two weaker notions of security, preserving and recovering security, which together, can be shown to imply the robustness result. The proofs utilise the H-coefficient technique that has found recent popularity in this area; providing a very useful tool for proving the generator meets the necessary security notions.

Category / Keywords: sponge; pseudo-random number generator (PRNG); Patarin's H-coefficient technique; robustness; Keccak; SHA-3; ideal permutation model

Original Publication (in the same form): SAC 2016

Date: received 8 Sep 2016, last revised 8 Sep 2016

Contact author: dojh342 at gmail com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20160914:035256 (All versions of this report)

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