Paper 2016/882
MSKT-ORAM: A Constant Bandwidth ORAM without Homomorphic Encryption
Jinsheng Zhang, Qiumao Ma, Wensheng Zhang, and Daji Qiao
Abstract
This paper proposes MSKT-ORAM, an efficient multiple server ORAM construction, to protect a client’s access pattern to outsourced data. MSKT-ORAM organizes each of the server storage as a k-ary tree and adopts XOR based PIR and a novel delayed eviction technique to optimize both the data query and data eviction process. MSKT-ORAM is proved to protect the data access pattern privacy at a failure probability of $2^{80}$ when $k\geq 128$. Meanwhile, given constant local storage, when $N$ (i.e., the total number of outsourced data blocks) ranges from $2^{16}$ to $2^{34}$ and data block size $B\geq 20$KB, the communication cost of MSKT-ORAM is only $22$ to $46$ data blocks. Asymptotical analysis and detailed implementation comparisons are conducted to show that MSKT-ORAM achieves better communication, storage and access delay in practical scenario over the compared state-of-the-art ORAM schemes.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint. MINOR revision.
- Keywords
- Oblivious RAMdata privacy
- Contact author(s)
- alexzjs @ iastate edu
- History
- 2017-01-03: revised
- 2016-09-14: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2016/882
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2016/882, author = {Jinsheng Zhang and Qiumao Ma and Wensheng Zhang and Daji Qiao}, title = {{MSKT}-{ORAM}: A Constant Bandwidth {ORAM} without Homomorphic Encryption}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2016/882}, year = {2016}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/882} }