Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2016/834

Multi-Key Homomorphic Signatures Unforgeable under Insider Corruption

Russell W. F. Lai and Raymond K. H. Tai and Harry W. H. Wong and Sherman S. M. Chow

Abstract: Homomorphic signatures (HS) allows the derivation of the signature of the message-function pair $(m, g)$, where $m = g(m_1, \ldots, m_K)$, given the signatures of each of the input messages $m_k$ signed under the same key. Multi-key HS (M-HS) introduced by Fiore et al. (ASIACRYPT'16) further enhances the utility by allowing evaluation of signatures under different keys. While the unforgeability of existing M-HS notions unrealistically assumes that all signers are honest, we consider the setting where an arbitrary number of signers can be corrupted, which is typical in natural applications (e.g., verifiable multi-party computation) of M-HS. Surprisingly, there is a huge gap between M-HS with and without unforgeability under corruption: While the latter can be constructed from standard lattice assumptions (ASIACRYPT'16), we show that the former must rely on non-falsifiable assumptions. Specifically, we propose a generic construction of M-HS with unforgeability under corruption from adaptive zero-knowledge succinct non-interactive arguments of knowledge (ZK-SNARK) (and other standard assumptions), and then show that such M-HS implies adaptive zero-knowledge succinct non-interactive arguments (ZK-SNARG). Our results leave open the pressing question of what level of authenticity can be guaranteed in the multi-key setting under standard assumptions.

Category / Keywords: foundations, digital signatures

Date: received 29 Aug 2016, last revised 24 Nov 2017

Contact author: sherman at ie cuhk edu hk

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20171124:155248 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2016/834


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