Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2016/808

Simulating Auxiliary Inputs, Revisited

Maciej Skorski

Abstract: For any pair $(X,Z)$ of correlated random variables we can think of $Z$ as a randomized function of $X$. If the domain of $Z$ is small, one can make this function computationally efficient by allowing it to be only approximately correct. In folklore this problem is known as _simulating auxiliary inputs_. This idea of simulating auxiliary information turns out to be a very usefull tool, finding applications in complexity theory, cryptography, pseudorandomness and zero-knowledge. In this paper we revisit this problem, achieving the following results:

(a) We present a novel boosting algorithm for constructing the simulator. This boosting proof is of independent interest, as it shows how to handle "negative mass" issues when constructing probability measures by shifting distinguishers in descent algorithms. Our technique essentially fixes the flaw in the TCC'14 paper "How to Fake Auxiliary Inputs".

(b) The complexity of our simulator is better than in previous works, including results derived from the uniform min-max theorem due to Vadhan and Zheng. To achieve $(s,\epsilon)$-indistinguishability we need the complexity $O\left(s\cdot 2^{5\ell}\epsilon^{-2}\right)$ in time/circuit size, which improve previous bounds by a factor of $\epsilon^{-2}$. In particular, with we get meaningful provable security for the EUROCRYPT'09 leakage-resilient stream cipher instantiated with a standard 256-bit block cipher, like $\mathsf{AES256}$.

Our boosting technique utilizes a two-step approach. In the first step we shift the current result (as in gradient or sub-gradient descent algorithms) and in the separate step we fix the biggest non-negative mass constraint violation (if applicable).

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Original Publication (in the same form): IACR-TCC B--2016

Date: received 23 Aug 2016, last revised 24 Aug 2016

Contact author: maciej skorski at gmail com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Short URL: ia.cr/2016/808

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