Paper 2016/805
Constant-Round Maliciously Secure Two-Party Computation in the RAM Model
Carmit Hazay and Avishay Yanai
Abstract
The random-access memory (RAM) model of computation allows program constant-time memory lookup and is more applicable in practice today, covering many important algorithms. This is in contrast to the classic setting of secure 2-party computation (2PC) that mostly follows the approach for which the desired functionality must be represented as a boolean circuit. In this work we design the first constant round maliciously secure two-party protocol in the RAM model. Our starting point is the garbled RAM construction of Gentry et al. (EUROCRYPT 2014) that readily induces a constant round semi-honest two-party protocol for any RAM program assuming identity-based encryption schemes. We show how to enhance the security of their construction into the malicious setting while facing several challenges that stem due to handling the data memory. Next, we show how to apply our techniques to a more recent garbled RAM construction by Garg et al. (STOC 2015) that is based on one-way functions.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Published by the IACR in TCC 2016
- Contact author(s)
- ay yanay @ gmail com
- History
- 2019-04-03: last of 2 revisions
- 2016-08-24: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2016/805
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2016/805,
author = {Carmit Hazay and Avishay Yanai},
title = {Constant-Round Maliciously Secure Two-Party Computation in the {RAM} Model},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2016/805},
year = {2016},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/805}
}
