Paper 2016/775

Cryptanalysis of a Homomorphic Encryption Scheme

Sonia Bogos, John Gaspoz, and Serge Vaudenay

Abstract

Homomorphic encryption allows to make specific operations on private data which stays encrypted. While applications such as cloud computing require to have a practical solution, the encryption scheme must be secure. In this article, we detail and analyze in-depth the homomorphic encryption scheme proposed by Zhou and Wornell. From the analysis of the encryption scheme, we are able to mount three attacks. The first attack enables to recover a secret plaintext message broadcasted to multiple users. The second attack performs a chosen ciphertext key recovery attack and it was implemented and verified. The last attack is a related chosen plaintext decryption attack.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. MINOR revision.Arcticcrypt 2016
Contact author(s)
soniamihaela bogos @ epfl ch
History
2016-08-12: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2016/775
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2016/775,
      author = {Sonia Bogos and John Gaspoz and Serge Vaudenay},
      title = {Cryptanalysis of a Homomorphic Encryption Scheme},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2016/775},
      year = {2016},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/775}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/775}
}
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