Paper 2016/754

Practical Key Recovery Attack on MANTIS-5

Christoph Dobraunig, Maria Eichlseder, Daniel Kales, and Florian Mendel


MANTIS is a lightweight tweakable block cipher recently published at CRYPTO 2016. In addition to the full 14-round version, MANTIS-7, the designers also propose an aggressive 10-round version, MANTIS-5. The security claim for MANTIS-5 is resistance against "practical attacks", defined as related-tweak attacks with data complexity $2^d$ less than $2^{30}$ chosen plaintexts (or $2^{40}$ known plaintexts), and computational complexity at most $2^{126-d}$. We present a key-recovery attack against MANTIS-5 with $2^{28}$ chosen plaintexts and a computational complexity of about $2^{38}$ block cipher calls, which violates this claim. Our attack is based on a family of differential characteristics and exploits several properties of the lightweight round function and tweakey schedule. To verify the validity of the attack, we also provide a practical implementation which recovers the full key in about 1 core hour using $2^{30}$ chosen plaintexts.

Available format(s)
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
cryptanalysisMANTISPRINCE-like ciphers
Contact author(s)
maria eichlseder @ iaik tugraz at
2016-08-30: revised
2016-08-09: received
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Creative Commons Attribution


      author = {Christoph Dobraunig and Maria Eichlseder and Daniel Kales and Florian Mendel},
      title = {Practical Key Recovery Attack on MANTIS-5},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2016/754},
      year = {2016},
      note = {\url{}},
      url = {}
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