Paper 2016/732
Nonlinear Invariant Attack --Practical Attack on Full SCREAM, iSCREAM, and Midori64
Yosuke Todo, Gregor Leander, and Yu Sasaki
Abstract
In this paper we introduce a new type of attack, called nonlinear invariant attack. As application examples, we present new attacks that are able to distinguish the full versions of the (tweakable) block ciphers Scream, iScream and Midori64 in a weak-key setting. Those attacks require only a handful of plaintext-ciphertext pairs and have minimal computational costs. Moreover, the nonlinear invariant attack on the underlying (tweakable) block cipher can be extended to a ciphertext-only attack in well-known modes of operation such as CBC or CTR. The plaintext of the authenticated encryption schemes SCREAM and iSCREAM can be practically recovered only from the ciphertexts in the nonce-respecting setting. This is the first result breaking a security claim of SCREAM. Moreover, the plaintext in Midori64 with well-known modes of operation can practically be recovered. All of our attacks are experimentally verified.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- A minor revision of an IACR publication in ASIACRYPT 2016
- Keywords
- Nonlinear invariant attackBoolean functionSCREAMiSCREAMMidori64CAESAR competition
- Contact author(s)
- todo yosuke @ lab ntt co jp
- History
- 2016-09-26: last of 2 revisions
- 2016-07-28: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2016/732
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2016/732,
author = {Yosuke Todo and Gregor Leander and Yu Sasaki},
title = {Nonlinear Invariant Attack --Practical Attack on Full {SCREAM}, {iSCREAM}, and Midori64},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2016/732},
year = {2016},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/732}
}
