SRMAP and ISLAP Authentication Protocols: Attacks and Improvements

Mohammad Mardani Shahrbabak; Shahab Abdolmaleky

Paper 2016/731

SRMAP and ISLAP Authentication Protocols: Attacks and Improvements

Mohammad Mardani Shahrbabak and Shahab Abdolmaleky

Abstract

RFID technology is a system which uses radio frequency to transmit data. Data transmission between Tags and Readers is wireless which can be easily eavesdropped by adversary. Due to security and privacy reasons, various authentication protocols proposed. In this paper, we cryptanalyze two different RFID authentication protocols and it is shown that either of them have some weaknesses. In 2014, Chang et al. proposed a mutual authentication protocol for RFID technology based on EPC Class 1 Generation 2 standard. We show that their protocol is not safe regard to privacy and cannot repulse neither Traceability attack nor Forward Traceability attack. Also, in 2015, Pourpouneh et al. proposed a server-less authentication protocol. We discover that their protocol is not able to thwart security and privacy attacks such as Secret Parameter Reveal, Traceability and Forward Traceability. In addition, we robust the two schemes to defend those attacks which can protect RFID users against different threats. Then, analyzing of the protocols are compared with some state-of-art ones.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Cryptographic protocols
Publication info: Preprint. MINOR revision.
Contact author(s): abdolmaleky sh @ gmail com
History: 2016-07-27: received
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2016/731
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2016/731,
      author = {Mohammad Mardani Shahrbabak and Shahab Abdolmaleky},
      title = {{SRMAP} and {ISLAP} Authentication Protocols: Attacks and Improvements},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2016/731},
      year = {2016},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/731}
}