### Comparison between Subfield and Straightforward Attacks on NTRU

Paul Kirchner and Pierre-Alain Fouque

##### Abstract

Recently in two independent papers, Albrecht, Bai and Ducas and Cheon, Jeong and Lee presented two very similar attacks, that allow to break NTRU with larger parameters and GGH Multinear Map without zero encodings. They proposed an algorithm for recovering the NTRU secret key given the public key which apply for large NTRU modulus, in particular to Fully Homomorphic Encryption schemes based on NTRU. Hopefully, these attacks do not endanger the security of the NTRUE NCRYPT scheme, but shed new light on the hardness of this problem. The basic idea of both attacks relies on decreasing the dimension of the NTRU lattice using the multiplication matrix by the norm (resp. trace) of the public key in some subfield instead of the public key itself. Since the dimension of the subfield is smaller, the dimension of the lattice decreases, and lattice reduction algorithm will perform better. Here, we revisit the attacks on NTRU and propose another variant that is simpler and outperforms both of these attacks in practice. It allows to break several concrete instances of YASHE, a NTRU-based FHE scheme, but it is not as efficient as the hybrid method of Howgrave-Graham on concrete parameters of NTRU. Instead of using the norm and trace, we propose to use the multiplication by the public key in some subring and show that this choice leads to better attacks. We &#8730; can then show that for power of two cyclotomic fields, the time complexity is polynomialFinally, we show that, under heuristics, straightforward lattice reduction is even more efficient, allowing to extend this result to fields without non-trivial subfields, such as NTRU Prime. We insist that the improvement on the analysis applies even for relatively small modulus ; though if the secret is sparse, it may not be the fastest attack. We also derive a tight estimation of security for (Ring-)LWE and NTRU assumptions. when $q=2^{\Omega(\sqrt{n \log \log n})}$.

Available format(s)
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords
cryptanalysislattice techniquesnumber theorypost quantum cryptographyNTRU
Contact author(s)
paul kirchner @ ens fr
History
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2016/717

CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2016/717,
author = {Paul Kirchner and Pierre-Alain Fouque},
title = {Comparison between Subfield and Straightforward Attacks on NTRU},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2016/717},
year = {2016},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/717}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/717}
}
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