Paper 2016/697

Ciphertext Forgery on HANUMAN

Damian Vizár

Abstract

HANUMAN is a mode of operation of a keyless cryptographic permutation for nonce-based authenticated encryption with associated data, included among the modes bundled in the PRIMATEs candidate in the currently ongoing CAESAR competition. HANUMAN is a sponge-like mode whose design and security argument are inspired by the SpongeWrap construction. We identify a flaw in the domain separation of HANUMAN, and show how to exploit it to efficiently produce ciphertext forgeries.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords
Authenticated encryptionPRIMATEsciphertext forgeryCAESAR competition
Contact author(s)
damian vizar @ epfl ch
History
2016-07-13: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2016/697
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2016/697,
      author = {Damian Vizár},
      title = {Ciphertext Forgery on HANUMAN},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2016/697},
      year = {2016},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/697}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/697}
}
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