Paper 2016/650

Securing Multiparty Protocols against the Exposure of Data to Honest Parties

Peeter Laud and Alisa Pankova


We consider a new adversarial goal in multiparty protocols, where the adversary may corrupt some parties. The goal is to manipulate the view of some honest party in a way, that this honest party learns the private data of some other honest party. The adversary itself might not learn this data at all. This goal, and such attacks are significant because they create a liability to the first honest party to clean its systems from second honest party's data; a task that may be highly non-trivial. Protecting against this goal essentially means achieving security against several non-cooperating adversaries, where all but one adversary are passive and corrupt only a single party. We formalize the adversarial goal by proposing an alternative notion of universal composability. We show how existing, conventionally secure multiparty protocols can be transformed to make them secure against the novel adversarial goal.

Available format(s)
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
secure multiparty computationuniversal composability
Contact author(s)
alisa @ cyber ee
2016-06-24: received
Short URL
Creative Commons Attribution


      author = {Peeter Laud and Alisa Pankova},
      title = {Securing Multiparty Protocols against the Exposure of Data to Honest Parties},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2016/650},
      year = {2016},
      note = {\url{}},
      url = {}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, does not use cookies or embedded third party content.