Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2016/623

EnCounter: On Breaking the Nonce Barrier in Differential Fault Analysis with a Case-Study on PAEQ

Dhiman Saha and Dipanwita Roy Chowdhury

Abstract: This work exploits internal differentials within a cipher in the context of Differential Fault Analysis (DFA). This in turn overcomes the nonce barrier which acts as a natural counter-measure against DFA. We introduce the concept of internal differential fault analysis which requires only one faulty ciphertext. In particular, the analysis is applicable to parallelizable ciphers that use the counter-mode. As a proof of concept we develop an internal differential fault attack called EnCounter on PAEQ which is an AES based parallelizable authenticated cipher presently in the second round of on-going CAESAR competition. The attack is able to uniquely retrieve the key of three versions of full-round PAEQ of key-sizes 64, 80 and 128 bits with complexities of about $2^{16}$, $2^{16}$ and $2^{50}$ respectively. Finally, this work addresses in detail the instance of fault analysis with varying amounts of partial state information and also presents the first analysis of PAEQ.

Category / Keywords: fault analysis, authenticated encryption, PAEQ, internal differential, AESQ, nonce, AES

Original Publication (in the same form): IACR-CHES-2016

Date: received 15 Jun 2016

Contact author: saha dhiman at gmail com, drc at cse iitkgp ernet in

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20160617:191942 (All versions of this report)

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