Paper 2016/621
4-Round Concurrent Non-Malleable Commitments from One-Way Functions
Michele Ciampi, Rafail Ostrovsky, Luisa Siniscalchi, and Ivan Visconti
Abstract
How many rounds and which computational assumptions are needed for concurrent non-malleable commitments? The above question has puzzled researchers for several years. Recently, Pass in [TCC 2013] proved a lower bound of 3 rounds when security is proven through black-box reductions to falsifiable assumptions. On the other side, positive results of Goyal [STOC 2011], Lin and Pass [STOC 2011] and Goyal et al. [FOCS 2012] showed that one-way functions are sufficient with a constant (at least 6) number of rounds. More recently Ciampi et al. [CRYPTO 2016] showed that subexponentially strong one-way permutations are sufficient with just 3 rounds. In this work we almost close the above open question by showing a 4-round concurrent non-malleable commitment scheme that only needs one-way functions. Our main technique consists in showing how to upgrade basic forms of non-malleability (i.e., non-malleability w.r.t. non-aborting adversaries) to full-fledged non-malleability without penalizing the round complexity.
Note: The last revisions fixed some typos and extended the comparison with the state of the art.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Publication info
- Preprint. MINOR revision.
- Keywords
- non-malleabilitydelayed-input protocols
- Contact author(s)
- ivan visconti @ gmail com
- History
- 2016-09-15: last of 6 revisions
- 2016-06-17: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2016/621
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2016/621,
author = {Michele Ciampi and Rafail Ostrovsky and Luisa Siniscalchi and Ivan Visconti},
title = {4-Round Concurrent Non-Malleable Commitments from One-Way Functions},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2016/621},
year = {2016},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/621}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/621}
}
