Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2016/608

LightSource: Ultra Lightweight Clone Detection of RFID Tags from Software Unclonable Responses

Hoda Maleki, Reza Rahaeimehr, and Marten van Dijk

Abstract: Radio-Frequency Identification (RFID) tags have been widely used as a low-cost wireless method for detection of counterfeit product injection in supply chains. In order to adequately perform authentication, current RFID monitoring schemes need to either have a persistent online connection between supply chain partners and the back-end database or have a local database on each partner site. A persistent online connection is not guaranteed and local databases on each partner site impose extra cost and security issues. We introduce a new method in which we use 2-3kb Non-Volatile Memory (NVM) in RFID tags themselves to function as a very small “encoded local database”. Our method allows us to get rid of local databases and there is no need to have any connection between supply chain partners and the back-end database except when they want to verify products. We formally define black-box software unclonability and prove our scheme to satisfy this property. To this purpose, we introduce a simple “XOR-ADD” function and prove it is hard to predict its challenge-response behavior if given only one challenge response pair. The XOR-ADD function with control logic can be implemented using at most 170 gates. This implies that our scheme is compatible with the strict power consumption constraints of cheap EPC Class 1 Gen 2 RFIDs.

Category / Keywords: applications / RFID based supply chain; clone detection; authentication; software unclonable responses

Date: received 10 Jun 2016

Contact author: hoda maleki at uconn edu

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20160614:172144 (All versions of this report)

Short URL:

[ Cryptology ePrint archive ]