Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2016/593

No Place to Hide: Contactless Probing of Secret Data on FPGAs

Heiko Lohrke and Shahin Tajik and Christian Boit and Jean-Pierre Seifert

Abstract: Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) have been the target of different physical attacks in recent years. Many different countermeasures have already been integrated into these devices to mitigate the existing vulnerabilities. However, there has not been enough attention paid to semi-invasive attacks from the IC backside due to the following reasons. First, the conventional semi-invasive attacks from the IC backside --- such as laser fault injection and photonic emission analysis --- cannot be scaled down without further effort to the very latest nanoscale technologies of modern FPGAs and programmable SoCs. Second, the more advanced solutions for secure storage, such as controlled Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs), make the conventional memory-readout techniques almost impossible. In this paper, however, novel approaches have been explored: Attacks based on Laser Voltage Probing (LVP) and its derivatives, as commonly used in Integrated Circuit (IC) debug for nanoscale low voltage technologies, are successfully launched against a $60$ nanometer technology FPGA. We discuss how these attacks can be used to break modern bitstream encryption implementations. Our attacks were carried out on a Proof-of-Concept PUF-based key generation implementation. To the best of our knowledge this is the first time that LVP is used to perform an attack on secure ICs.

Category / Keywords: FPGA Security, Semi-Invasive Attack, Laser Voltage Probing, Physically Unclonable Function

Original Publication (in the same form): IACR-CHES-2016

Date: received 6 Jun 2016

Contact author: heiko lohrke at campus tu-berlin de, stajik at sec t-labs tu-berlin de

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20190305:125121 (All versions of this report)

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