Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2016/552

Provably Secure Password Authenticated Key Exchange Based on RLWE for the Post-QuantumWorld

Jintai Ding and Saed Alsayigh and Jean Lancrenon and Saraswathy RV and Michael Snook

Abstract: Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) is a cryptographic scheme with the aim to establish a high-entropy and secret session key over a insecure communications network. \emph{Password}-Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) assumes that the parties in play share a simple password, which is cheap and human-memorable and is used to achieve the authentication. PAKEs are practically relevant as these features are extremely appealing in an age where most people access sensitive personal data remotely from more-and-more pervasive hand-held devices. Theoretically, PAKEs allow the secure computation and authentication of a high-entropy piece of data using a low-entropy string as a starting point. In this paper, we apply the recently proposed technique introduced in~\cite{DXX2012} to construct two lattice-based PAKE protocols enjoying a very simple and elegant design that is an parallel extension of the class of Random Oracle Model (ROM)-based protocols \msf{PAK} and \msf{PPK}~\cite{BMP2000,M2002}, but in the lattice-based setting. The new protocol resembling \msf{PAK} is three-pass, and provides \emph{mutual explicit authentication}, while the protocol following the structure of \msf{PPK} is two-pass, and provides \emph{implicit authentication}. Our protocols rely on the Ring-Learning-with-Errors (RLWE) assumption, and exploit the additive structure of the underlying ring. They have a comparable level of efficiency to \msf{PAK} and \msf{PPK}, which makes them highly attractive. We present a preliminary implementation of our protocols to demonstrate that they are both efficient and practical. We believe they are suitable quantum safe replacements for \msf{PAK} and \msf{PPK}.

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / Diffie-Hellman, Key Exchange, Authenticated, PAKE, RLWE

Date: received 1 Jun 2016

Contact author: jintai ding at gmail com; alsayisd at gmail com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20160602:165917 (All versions of this report)

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