Paper 2016/521

SAT-based cryptanalysis of ACORN

Frédéric Lafitte, Liran Lerman, Olivier Markowitch, and Dirk Van Heule

Abstract

The CAESAR competition aims to provide a portfolio of authenticated encryption algorithms. SAT solvers represent powerful tools to verify automatically and efficiently (among others) the confidentiality and the authenticity of information claimed by cryptographic primitives. In this work, we study the security of the CAESAR candidate ACORN against a SAT-based cryptanalysis. We provide the first practical and efficient attacks on the first and the last versions of ACORN. More precisely, we achieve state recovery, key recovery, state collision as well as forgery attacks. All our results demonstrate the usefulness of SAT solvers to cryptanalyse all the candidates of the CAESAR competition, thereby accelerating the "test of time".

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
SAT-based cryptanalysisCAESAR competitionAuthenticated encryptionACORN
Contact author(s)
llerman @ ulb ac be
History
2016-05-29: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2016/521
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2016/521,
      author = {Frédéric Lafitte and Liran Lerman and Olivier Markowitch and Dirk Van Heule},
      title = {SAT-based cryptanalysis of ACORN},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2016/521},
      year = {2016},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/521}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/521}
}
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