Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2016/449

Loop-Abort Faults on Lattice-Based Fiat–Shamir and Hash-and-Sign Signatures

Thomas Espitau and Pierre-Alain Fouque and Benoît Gérard and Mehdi Tibouchi

Abstract: As the advent of general-purpose quantum computers appears to be drawing closer, agencies and advisory bodies have started recommending that we prepare the transition away from factoring and discrete logarithm-based cryptography, and towards postquantum secure constructions, such as lattice- based schemes. Almost all primitives of classical cryptography (and more!) can be realized with lattices, and the efficiency of primitives like encryption and signatures has gradually improved to the point that key sizes are competitive with RSA at similar security levels, and fast performance can be achieved both in soft- ware and hardware. However, little research has been conducted on physical attacks targeting concrete implementations of postquantum cryptography in general and lattice-based schemes in particular, and such research is essential if lattices are going to replace RSA and elliptic curves in our devices and smart cards. In this paper, we look in particular at fault attacks against implementations of lattice-based signature schemes, looking both at Fiat–Shamir type constructions (particularly BLISS, but also GLP, PASSSing and Ring-TESLA) and at hash-and-sign schemes (particularly the GPV-based scheme of Ducas–Prest– Lyubashevsky). These schemes include essentially all practical lattice-based signatures, and achieve the best efficiency to date in both software and hardware. We present several fault attacks against those schemes yielding a full key recovery with only a few or even a single faulty signature, and discuss possible countermeasures to protect against these attacks.

Category / Keywords: Fault Attacks, Digital Signatures, Postquantum Cryptography, Lattices, BLISS, GPV

Date: received 7 May 2016, last revised 1 Jun 2016

Contact author: t espitau at gmail com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20160601:205903 (All versions of this report)

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