Paper 2016/420

A note on the security of threshold implementations with $d+1$ input shares

Santos Merino Del Pozo and François-Xavier Standaert

Abstract

Recently, threshold implementations (TI) with $d + 1$ input shares have been proposed at Crypto 2015. This optimization aims for more lightweight TI designs while keeping the glitch-resistance of the original concept. In this note, we consider such an approach and provide preliminary simulation-based evidence, backed by empirical results, of the existence of $d^{\text{th}}$-order leakages. We conclude that, while for first-order TI designs this solution can be overkill due to the extra randomness requirements, higher-order TIs can still benefit from it.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Implementation
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords
threshold implementationsmasking
Contact author(s)
santos merino @ uclouvain be
History
2016-05-01: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2016/420
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2016/420,
      author = {Santos Merino Del Pozo and François-Xavier Standaert},
      title = {A note on the security of threshold implementations with $d+1$ input shares},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2016/420},
      year = {2016},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/420}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/420}
}
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