Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2016/415

Lattice-Based Signature Schemes and their Sensitivity to Fault Attacks

Nina Bindel and Johannes Buchmann and Juliane Krämer

Abstract: Due to their high efficiency and their strong security properties, lattice-based cryptographic schemes seem to be a very promising post-quantum replacement for currently used public key cryptography. The security of lattice-based schemes has been deeply analyzed mathematically, whereas little effort has been spent on the analysis against implementation attacks. In this paper, we start with the fault analysis of one of the most important cryptographic primitives: signature schemes. We investigate the vulnerability and resistance of the currently most efficient lattice-based signature schemes BLISS (CRYPTO 2013), ring-TESLA (AfricaCrypt 2016), and the GLP scheme (CHES 2012) and their implementations. We consider different kinds of (first-order) randomizing, zeroing, and skipping faults. For each of the signature schemes, we found at least six effective attacks. To increase the security of lattice-based signature schemes, we propose countermeasures for each of the respective attacks.

Category / Keywords: public-key cryptography / lattice-based cryptography, signature scheme, fault attack, side channel analysis

Date: received 27 Apr 2016, last revised 22 Feb 2017

Contact author: nbindel at cdc informatik tu-darmstadt de

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Version: 20170222:110700 (All versions of this report)

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