Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2016/415
Lattice-Based Signature Schemes and their Sensitivity to Fault Attacks
Nina Bindel and Johannes Buchmann and Juliane Krämer
Abstract: Due to their high efficiency and their strong security properties, lattice-based cryptographic schemes seem to be a very promising post-quantum replacement for currently used public key cryptography. The security of lattice-based schemes has been deeply analyzed mathematically, whereas little effort has been spent on the analysis against implementation attacks.
In this paper, we start with the fault analysis of one of the most important cryptographic primitives: signature schemes. We investigate the vulnerability and resistance of the currently most efficient lattice-based signature schemes BLISS (CRYPTO 2013), ring-TESLA (AfricaCrypt 2016), and the GLP scheme (CHES 2012) and their implementations. We consider different kinds of (first-order) randomizing, zeroing, and skipping faults. For each of the signature
schemes, we found at least six effective attacks. To increase the security of lattice-based signature schemes, we propose countermeasures for each of the respective attacks.
Category / Keywords: public-key cryptography / lattice-based cryptography, signature scheme, fault attack, side channel analysis
Date: received 27 Apr 2016, last revised 22 Feb 2017
Contact author: nbindel at cdc informatik tu-darmstadt de
Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation
Version: 20170222:110700 (All versions of this report)
Short URL: ia.cr/2016/415
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