Paper 2016/326

Square Attack on 7-Round Kiasu-BC

Christoph Dobraunig, Maria Eichlseder, and Florian Mendel

Abstract

Kiasu-BC is a tweakable block cipher presented within the TWEAKEY framework at AsiaCrypt 2014. Kiasu-BC is almost identical to AES-128, the only difference to AES-128 is the tweak addition, where the 64-bit tweak is xored to the first two rows of every round-key. The security analysis of the designers focuses primarily on related-key related-tweak differential characteristics and meet-in-the-middle attacks. For other attacks, they conclude that the security level of Kiasu-BC is similar to AES-128. In this work, we provide the first third-party analysis of Kiasu-BC. We show that we can mount Square attacks on up to 7-round Kiasu-BC with a complexity of about $2^{48.5}$ encryptions, which improves upon the best published 7-round attacks for AES-128. Furthermore, we show that such attacks are applicable to the round-reduced OCB3-like mode of the CAESAR candidate Kiasu. To be specific, we show a key-recovery attack on 7-round Kiasu$\neq$ with a complexity of about $2^{82}$ encryptions.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. ACNS 2016
Keywords
CryptanalysisTWEAKEYKiasuSquare Attack
Contact author(s)
christoph dobraunig @ iaik tugraz at
History
2016-06-13: last of 2 revisions
2016-03-25: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2016/326
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2016/326,
      author = {Christoph Dobraunig and Maria Eichlseder and Florian Mendel},
      title = {Square Attack on 7-Round Kiasu-{BC}},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2016/326},
      year = {2016},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/326}
}
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