Various Proxy Re-Encryption Schemes from Lattices

Xiong Fan; Feng-Hao Liu

Paper 2016/278

Various Proxy Re-Encryption Schemes from Lattices

Xiong Fan and Feng-Hao Liu

Abstract

Proxy re-encryption (PRE) was introduced by Blaze, Bleumer and Strauss [Eurocrypt '98]. Basically, PRE allows a semi-trusted proxy to transform a ciphertext encrypted under one key into an encryption of the same plaintext under another key, without revealing the underlying plaintext. Since then, many interesting applications have been explored, and many constructions in various settings have been proposed. In 2007, Cannetti and Honhenberger [CCS '07] defined a stronger notion -- CCA-security and construct a bi-directional PRE scheme. Later on, several work considered CCA-secure PRE based on bilinear group assumptions. Very recently, Kirshanova [PKC '14] proposed the first single-hop CCA-secure PRE scheme based on learning with errors (LWE) assumption. In this work, we first point out a subtle but serious mistake in the security proof of the work by Kirshanova. This reopens the direction of lattice-based CCA-secure constructions, even in the single-hop setting. Then we propose a new LWE-based single-hop CCA-secure PRE scheme. Finally, we extend the construction to support multi-hop re-encryptions for different levels of security under different settings.

Note: This work is super-seeded by http://eprint.iacr.org/2017/456 with additional results.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Public-key cryptography
Publication info: Preprint. MINOR revision.
Contact author(s): xfan @ cs cornell edu
History: 2017-05-25: last of 2 revisions; 2016-03-14: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2016/278
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2016/278,
      author = {Xiong Fan and Feng-Hao Liu},
      title = {Various Proxy Re-Encryption Schemes from Lattices},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2016/278},
      year = {2016},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/278}
}