Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2016/276

Arithmetic coding and blinding countermeasures for lattice signatures

Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen

Abstract: We describe new arithmetic coding techniques and side-channel blinding countermeasures for lattice-based cryptography. Using these techniques, we develop a practical, compact, and more quantum-resistant variant of the BLISS Ideal Lattice Signature Scheme. We first show how the BLISS parameters and hash-based random oracle can be modified to be more secure against quantum pre-image attacks while optimizing signature size. Arithmetic Coding offers an information theoretically optimal compression for stationary and memoryless sources, such as the discrete Gaussian distributions often present in lattice-based cryptography. We show that this technique gives better signature sizes than the previously proposed advanced Huffman-based signature compressors. We further demonstrate that arithmetic decoding from an uniform source to target distribution is also an optimal non-uniform sampling method in the sense that a minimal amount of true random bits is required. Performance of this new Binary Arithmetic Coding sampler is comparable to other practical samplers. The same code tables, or circuitry can be utilized for both tasks, eliminating the need for separate sampling and compression components. We then describe simple randomized blinding techniques that can be applied to anti-cyclic polynomial multiplication to mask timing- and power consumption side-channels in ring arithmetic. We further show that the Gaussian sampling process can also be blinded by a split-and-permute techniques as an effective countermeasure against side-channel attacks.

Category / Keywords: Lattice Signatures, Arithmetic coding, Side-Channel Countermeasures, Quantum-Resistant Cryptography, BLISS

Original Publication (with minor differences): Journal of Cryptographic Engineering, Springer

Date: received 11 Mar 2016, last revised 22 Jan 2017

Contact author: mjos at iki fi

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

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Version: 20170123:050054 (All versions of this report)

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