**Spooky Encryption and its Applications**

*Yevgeniy Dodis and Shai Halevi and Ron D. Rothblum and Daniel Wichs*

**Abstract: **Consider a setting where inputs $x_1,\ldots,x_n$ are encrypted
under independent public keys. Given the ciphertexts $\{c_i =
Enc(pk_i,x_i)\}_i$, Alice outputs ciphertexts
$c'_1,\ldots,c'_n$ that decrypt to $y_1,\ldots,y_n$
respectively. What relationships between the $x_i$'s and $y_i$'s
can Alice induce?

Motivated by applications to delegating computations, Dwork, Langberg, Naor, Nissim and Reingold (unpublished manuscript, 2004) showed that a semantically secure scheme disallows signaling in this setting, meaning that $y_i$ cannot depend on $x_j$ for $j \neq i$ . On the other hand if the scheme is homomorphic then any local (component-wise) relationship is achievable, meaning that each $y_i$ can be an arbitrary function of $x_i$. However, there are also relationships which are neither signaling nor local. Dwork et al. asked if it is possible to have encryption schemes that support such ``spooky'' relationships. Answering this question is the focus of our work.

Our first result shows that, under the LWE assumption, there exist encryption schemes supporting a large class of ``spooky'' relationships, which we call additive function sharing (AFS) spooky. In particular, for any polynomial-time function $f$, Alice can ensure that $y_1,\ldots,y_n$ are random subject to $\sum_{i=1}^n y_i = f(x_1,\ldots,x_n)$. For this result, the public keys all depend on common public randomness. Our second result shows that, assuming sub-exponentially hard indistinguishability obfuscation (iO) (and additional more standard assumptions), we can remove the common randomness and choose the public keys completely independently. Furthermore, in the case of $n=2$ inputs, we get a scheme that supports an even larger class of spooky relationships.

We discuss several implications of AFS-spooky encryption. Firstly, it gives a strong counter-example to a method proposed by Aiello et al. (ICALP, 2000) for building arguments for NP from homomorphic encryption. Secondly, it gives a simple 2-round multi-party computation protocol where, at the end of the first round, the parties can locally compute an additive secret sharing of the output. Lastly, it immediately yields a function secret sharing (FSS) scheme for all functions.

We also define a notion of spooky-free encryption, which ensures that no spooky relationship is achievable. We show that any non-malleable encryption scheme is spooky-free. Furthermore, we can construct spooky-free homomorphic encryption schemes from SNARKs, and it remains an open problem whether it is possible to do so from falsifiable assumptions.

**Category / Keywords: **foundations / Spooky Encryption, Delegation, Homomorphic Encryption, Function Secret Sharing

**Date: **received 10 Mar 2016

**Contact author: **ronr at csail mit edu

**Available format(s): **PDF | BibTeX Citation

**Version: **20160310:181253 (All versions of this report)

**Short URL: **ia.cr/2016/272

**Discussion forum: **Show discussion | Start new discussion

[ Cryptology ePrint archive ]