Paper 2016/225

A New Birthday-Type Algorithm for Attacking the Fresh Re-Keying Countermeasure

Qian Guo and Thomas Johansson

Abstract

The fresh re-keying scheme is a countermeasure designed to protect low-cost devices against side-channel attacks. In this paper, we present a new birthday-type attack based on a refined reduction to Ring-LPN with a reducible polynomial. Compared with the previous research, our algorithm significantly reduces the time complexity in the 128-bit leakage model—with an SNR equal to 8 and at most $2^{20}$ traces, for instance, the key can be recovered using $2^{41.99}$ bit-operations.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
LPNRing-LPNfresh re-keyingbirthday attacks
Contact author(s)
fywzguoqian @ gmail com
History
2016-03-01: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2016/225
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2016/225,
      author = {Qian Guo and Thomas Johansson},
      title = {A New Birthday-Type Algorithm for Attacking the Fresh Re-Keying Countermeasure},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2016/225},
      year = {2016},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/225}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/225}
}
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