Paper 2016/164

Sanitization of FHE Ciphertexts

Léo Ducas and Damien Stehle

Abstract

By definition, fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) schemes support homomorphic decryption, and all known FHE constructions are bootstrapped from a Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption (SHE) scheme via this technique. Additionally, when a public key is provided, ciphertexts are also re-randomizable, e.g., by adding to them fresh encryptions of 0. From those two operations we devise an algorithm to sanitize a ciphertext, by making its distribution canonical. In particular, the distribution of the ciphertext does not depend on the circuit that led to it via homomorphic evaluation, thus providing circuit privacy in the honest-but-curious model. Unlike the previous approach based on noise flooding, our approach does not degrade much the security/efficiency trade-off of the underlying FHE. The technique can be applied to all lattice-based FHE proposed so far, without substantially affecting their concrete parameters.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Published by the IACR in EUROCRYPT 2016
Contact author(s)
damien stehle @ gmail com
History
2016-02-19: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2016/164
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2016/164,
      author = {Léo Ducas and Damien Stehle},
      title = {Sanitization of FHE Ciphertexts},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2016/164},
      year = {2016},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/164}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/164}
}
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