Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2016/129

ECDH Key-Extraction via Low-Bandwidth Electromagnetic Attacks on PCs

Daniel Genkin and Lev Pachmanov and Itamar Pipman and Eran Tromer

Abstract: We present the first physical side-channel attack on elliptic curve cryptography running on a PC. The attack targets the ECDH public-key encryption algorithm, as implemented in the latest version of GnuPG's Libgcrypt.

By measuring the target's electromagnetic emanations, the attack extracts the secret decryption key within seconds, from a target located in an adjacent room across a wall. The attack utilizes a single carefully chosen ciphertext, and tailored time-frequency signal analysis techniques, to achieve full key extraction.

Category / Keywords: implementation / side-channel attack, elliptic curve cryptography, electromagnetic emanations

Original Publication (with minor differences): CT-RSA 2016
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-29485-8_13

Date: received 12 Feb 2016, last revised 17 Feb 2016

Contact author: tromer at cs tau ac il

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20160217:213703 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2016/129

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