Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2016/118

Circuit-ABE from LWE: Unbounded Attributes and Semi-Adaptive Security

Zvika Brakerski and Vinod Vaikuntanathan

Abstract: We construct an LWE-based key-policy attribute-based encryption (ABE) scheme that supports attributes of unbounded polynomial length. Namely, the size of the public parameters is a fixed polynomial in the security parameter and a depth bound, and with these fixed length parameters, one can encrypt attributes of arbitrary length. Similarly, any polynomial size circuit that adheres to the depth bound can be used as the policy circuit regardless of its input length (recall that a depth $d$ circuit can have as many as $2^d$ inputs). This is in contrast to previous LWE-based schemes where the length of the public parameters has to grow linearly with the maximal attribute length.

We prove that our scheme is semi-adaptively secure, namely, the adversary can choose the challenge attribute after seeing the public parameters (but before any decryption keys). Previous LWE-based constructions were only able to achieve selective security. (We stress that the complexity leveraging technique is not applicable for unbounded attributes.)

We believe that our techniques are of interest at least as much as our end result. Fundamentally, selective security and bounded attributes are both shortcomings that arise out of the current LWE proof techniques that program the challenge attributes into the public parameters. The LWE toolbox we develop in this work allows us to "delay" this programming. In a nutshell, the new tools include a way to generate an a-priori unbounded sequence of LWE matrices, and have fine-grained control over which trapdoor is embedded in each and every one of them, all with succinct representation.

Category / Keywords: public-key cryptography / attribute-based encryption

Date: received 11 Feb 2016, last revised 13 Mar 2016

Contact author: vinodv at mit edu

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Note: Typo fixed.

Version: 20160313:151312 (All versions of this report)

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