Paper 2016/1147

Cryptanalysis of a certificateless aggregate signature scheme

Nasrollah Pakniat and Mahnaz Noroozi

Abstract

Recently, Nie et al. proposed a certificateless aggregate signature scheme. In the standard security model considered in certificateless cryptography, we are dealing with two types of adversaries. In this paper, we show that Nie et al.'s scheme is insecure against the adversary of the first type. In other words, although they claimed that their proposed scheme is existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen message attack considering the adversaries in certificateless settings, we prove that such a forgery can be done.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Minor revision. 9th National Conference of Command, Control, Communication and Computers & Intelligence (C4I)
Contact author(s)
pakniat @ irandoc ac ir
History
2016-12-21: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2016/1147
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2016/1147,
      author = {Nasrollah Pakniat and Mahnaz Noroozi},
      title = {Cryptanalysis of a certificateless aggregate signature scheme},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2016/1147},
      year = {2016},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1147}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1147}
}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.