Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2016/1139

Comments on “Flaw in the Security Analysis of Leakage-resilient Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol from CT-RSA 2016 and Restoring the Security Proof”

Rongmao Chen and Yi Mu and Guomin Yang and Willy Susilo and Fuchun Guo

Abstract: In CT-RSA 2016, Chen, Mu, Yang, Susilo and Guo proposed a strongly leakage-resilient authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocol. In a rencent work, Chakraborty et al. claimed that they identified a flaw in the security analysis of Chen et al.’s protocol. In the letter, we point out that the flaw identified by Chakraborty et al. is invalid and does not exist in the original proof presented in Chen et al.’s paper.

Category / Keywords: public-key cryptography / public-key cryptography

Date: received 8 Dec 2016, withdrawn 22 Dec 2016

Contact author: rc517 at uowmail edu au

Available format(s): (-- withdrawn --)

Version: 20161223:053258 (All versions of this report)

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