Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2016/1127

Related-Key Impossible-Differential Attack on Reduced-Round SKINNY

Ralph Ankele and Subhadeep Banik and Avik Chakraborti and Eik List and Florian Mendel and Siang Meng Sim and Gaoli Wang

Abstract: At CRYPTO'16, Beierle et al. presented SKINNY, a family of lightweight tweakable block ciphers intended to compete with SIMON. SKINNY can be implemented efficiently in both soft- and hardware, possesses a Substitution- Permutation-Network structure, and supports block sizes of 64 and 128 bits as well as key and tweak sizes of 64, 128, 192, and 256 bits. This paper outlines a related-tweakey impossible-differential attack on 21 rounds of SKINNY-64/128 and two attacks on 22 and 23 rounds of SKINNY-64/128 under the assumption that 48 bits of the tweakey are public.

Category / Keywords: Symmetric cryptography, cryptanalysis, tweakable block cipher, impossible differentials, lightweight cryptography

Date: received 1 Dec 2016, last revised 13 Jan 2017

Contact author: ralph ankele 2015 at live rhul ac uk

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Note: extend results to a 23 round attack

Version: 20170113:133445 (All versions of this report)

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