Insecurity of RCB: Leakage-Resilient Authenticated Encryption

Farzaneh abed; Francesco Berti; Stefan Lucks

Paper 2016/1121

Insecurity of RCB: Leakage-Resilient Authenticated Encryption

Farzaneh abed, Francesco Berti, and Stefan Lucks

Abstract

Leakage-resilient cryptography is about security in the pres- ence of leakage from side-channels. In this paper, we present several issues of the RCB block cipher mode. Agrawal et al [2] proposed recently RCB as a leakage-resilient authenticated encryption (AE) scheme. Our main result is that RCB fails to provide authenticity, even in the absence of leakage.

Note: notions section is added to the road map.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Publication info: Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords: authenticated encryption leakage-resilience block cipher attack
Contact author(s): farzaneh abed @ uni-weimar de
francesco berti @ uclouvain be
History: 2016-12-01: revised; 2016-12-01: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2016/1121
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2016/1121,
      author = {Farzaneh abed and Francesco Berti and Stefan Lucks},
      title = {Insecurity of {RCB}: Leakage-Resilient Authenticated Encryption},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2016/1121},
      year = {2016},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1121}
}