Paper 2016/1121

Insecurity of RCB: Leakage-Resilient Authenticated Encryption

Farzaneh abed, Francesco Berti, and Stefan Lucks

Abstract

Leakage-resilient cryptography is about security in the pres- ence of leakage from side-channels. In this paper, we present several issues of the RCB block cipher mode. Agrawal et al [2] proposed recently RCB as a leakage-resilient authenticated encryption (AE) scheme. Our main result is that RCB fails to provide authenticity, even in the absence of leakage.

Note: notions section is added to the road map.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords
authenticated encryptionleakage-resilienceblock cipherattack
Contact author(s)
farzaneh abed @ uni-weimar de
francesco berti @ uclouvain be
History
2016-12-01: revised
2016-12-01: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2016/1121
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2016/1121,
      author = {Farzaneh abed and Francesco Berti and Stefan Lucks},
      title = {Insecurity of RCB: Leakage-Resilient Authenticated Encryption},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2016/1121},
      year = {2016},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1121}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1121}
}
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