Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2016/1094

New Revocable IBE in Prime-Order Groups: Adaptively Secure, Decryption Key Exposure Resistant, and with Short Public Parameters

Yohei Watanabe and Keita Emura and Jae Hong Seo

Abstract: Revoking corrupted users is a desirable functionality for cryptosystems. Since Boldyreva, Goyal, and Kumar (ACM CCS 2008) proposed a notable result for scalable revocation method in identity-based encryption (IBE), several works have improved either the security or the efficiency of revocable IBE (RIBE). Currently, all existing scalable RIBE schemes that achieve adaptively security against decryption key exposure resistance (DKER) can be categorized into two groups; either with long public parameters or over composite-order bilinear groups. From both practical and theoretical points of views, it would be interesting to construct adaptively secure RIBE scheme with DKER and short public parameters in prime-order bilinear groups.

In this paper, we address this goal by using Seo and Emura's technique (PKC 2013), which transforms the Waters IBE to the corresponding RIBE. First, we identify necessary requirements for the input IBE of their transforming technique. Next, we propose a new IBE scheme having several desirable properties; satisfying all the requirements for the Seo-Emura technique, constant-size public parameters, and using prime-order bilinear groups. Finally, by applying the Seo-Emura technique, we obtain the first adaptively secure RIBE scheme with DKER and constant-size public parameters in prime-order bilinear groups. We also discuss some extensions of the proposed RIBE scheme.

Category / Keywords: public-key cryptography / Revocable identity-based encryption, static assumptions, asymmetric pairings.

Original Publication (with major differences): CT-RSA 2017

Date: received 21 Nov 2016, last revised 11 Sep 2017

Contact author: watanabe at uec ac jp

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Note: Added detailed descriptions of extensions of the proposed scheme.

Version: 20170912:034818 (All versions of this report)

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