Paper 2016/1083

Constructions Secure against Receiver Selective Opening and Chosen Ciphertext Attacks

Dingding Jia, Xianhui Lu, and Bao Li

Abstract

In this paper we study public key encryption schemes of indistinguishability security against receiver selective opening (IND-RSO) attacks, where the attacker can corrupt some receivers and get the corresponding secret keys in the multi-party setting. Concretely: -We present a general construction of RSO security against chosen ciphertext attacks (RSO-CCA) by combining any RSO secure scheme against chosen plaintext attacks (RSO-CPA) with any regular CCA secure scheme, along with an appropriate non-interactive zero-knowledge proof. -We show that the leakage-resistant construction given by Hazay \emph{et al.} in Eurocrypt 2013 from weak hash proof system (wHPS) is RSO-CPA secure. -We further show that the CCA secure construction given by Cramer and Shoup in Eurocrypt 2002 based on the universal HPS is RSO-CCA secure, hence obtain a more efficient paradigm for RSO-CCA security.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Minor revision. CT-RSA 2017
Keywords
receiver selective openingchosen ciphertext securityhash proof system
Contact author(s)
ddjia @ is ac cn
History
2016-11-21: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2016/1083
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2016/1083,
      author = {Dingding Jia and Xianhui Lu and Bao Li},
      title = {Constructions Secure against Receiver Selective Opening and Chosen Ciphertext Attacks},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2016/1083},
      year = {2016},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1083}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1083}
}
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