## Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2016/1003

Cryptanalysis of Indistinguishability Obfuscations of Circuits over GGH13

Daniel Apon and Nico Döttling and Sanjam Garg and Pratyay Mukherjee

Abstract: Annihilation attacks, introduced in the work of Miles, Sahai, and Zhandry (CRYPTO 2016), are a class of polynomial-time attacks against several candidate indistinguishability obfuscation ($i\mathcal{O}$) schemes, built from Garg, Gentry, and Halevi (EUROCRYPT 2013) multilinear maps. In this work, we provide a general efficiently-testable property of two branching programs, called partial inequivalence'', which we show is sufficient for our variant of annihilation attacks on several obfuscation constructions based on GGH13 multilinear maps.

We give examples of pairs of natural $\mathsf{NC}^1$ circuits, which -- when processed via Barrington's Theorem -- yield pairs of branching programs that are partially inequivalent. As a consequence we are also able to show examples of bootstrapping circuits,'' used to obtain obfuscations for all circuits (given an obfuscator for $\mathsf{NC}^1$ circuits), in certain settings also yield partially inequivalent branching programs. Prior to our work, no attacks on any obfuscation constructions for these settings were known.

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Date: received 21 Oct 2016, last revised 18 Jun 2017

Contact author: pratyay85 at gmail com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Short URL: ia.cr/2016/1003

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