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Paper 2016/070

Domain-Specific Pseudonymous Signatures Revisited

Kamil Kluczniak


Domain-Specific Pseudonymous Signature schemes were recently proposed for privacy preserving authentication of digital identity documents by the BSI, German Federal Office for Information Security. The crucial property of domain-specific pseudonymous signatures is that a signer may derive unique pseudonyms within a so called domain. Now, the signer's true identity is hidden behind his domain pseudonyms and these pseudonyms are unlinkable, i.e. it is infeasible to correlate two pseudonyms from distinct domains with the identity of a single signer. In this paper we take a critical look at the security definitions and constructions of domain-specific pseudonymous signatures proposed by far. We review two articles which propose ``sound and clean'' security definitions and point out some issues present in these models. Some of the issues we present may have a strong practical impact on constructions ``provably secure'' in this models. Additionally, we point out some worrisome facts about the proposed schemes and their security analysis.

Note: This version fixes some editorial mistakes.

Available format(s)
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
public-key cryptographyeID DocumentsPrivacyDomain SignaturesPseudonymitySecurity DefinitionProvable Security
Contact author(s)
kamil kluczniak @ pwr edu pl
2016-02-11: revised
2016-01-26: received
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Creative Commons Attribution


      author = {Kamil Kluczniak},
      title = {Domain-Specific Pseudonymous Signatures Revisited},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2016/070},
      year = {2016},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/070}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/070}
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