Paper 2016/032

On the Leakage-Resilient Key Exchange

Janaka Alawatugoda

Abstract

Typically, secure channels are constructed from an authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocol, which authenticates the communicating parties based on long-term public keys and establishes secret session keys. In this paper we address the partial leakage of long-term secret keys of key exchange protocol participants due to various side-channel attacks. Security models for two-party authenticated key exchange protocols have developed over time to provide security even when the adversary learns certain secret values. This paper combines and extends the advances of security modelling for AKE protocols addressing more granular partial leakage of long-term secrets of protocol participants.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords
Public Key CryptographyKey Exchange ProtocolsLeakage-Resilient Cryptography
Contact author(s)
janaka alawatugoda @ qut edu au
History
2016-01-13: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2016/032
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2016/032,
      author = {Janaka Alawatugoda},
      title = {On the Leakage-Resilient Key Exchange},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2016/032},
      year = {2016},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/032}
}
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