Paper 2015/912

Extraction of intrinsic structure for Hardware Trojan detection

Maxime Lecomte, Jacques Fournier, and Philippe Maurine


In this paper we present a novel solution to address the problem of potential malicious circuitry on FPGA. This method is based on an a technique of structure extraction which consider the infection of an all lot. This structure is related to the design (place and route, power grid\dots) of the integrated circuits which composes the lot. In case of additional circuitry this design will be modify and the extracted structure will be affected. After developing the extraction techniques we present a methodology to insert detection of hardware trojan and counterfeit in different IC manufacturing steps. At last an application example using 30 FPGA boards validate our extraction method. Finally, statistical tools are then applied on the experimental results to distinguish a genuine lot from an infected one and confirm the potential of detection the extracted structure.

Available format(s)
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
hardware trojan detection
Contact author(s)
maxime lecomte @ cea fr
2015-09-22: received
Short URL
Creative Commons Attribution


      author = {Maxime Lecomte and Jacques Fournier and Philippe Maurine},
      title = {Extraction of intrinsic structure for Hardware Trojan detection},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2015/912},
      year = {2015},
      note = {\url{}},
      url = {}
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