### Multi-Variate High-Order Attacks of Shuffled Tables Recomputation

Nicolas BRUNEAU, Sylvain GUILLEY, Zakaria NAJM, and Yannick TEGLIA

##### Abstract

Masking schemes based on tables recomputation are classical countermeasures against high-order side-channel attacks. Still, they are known to be attackable at order $d$ in the case the masking involves $d$ shares. In this work, we mathematically show that an attack of order strictly greater than $d$ can be more successful than an attack at order $d$. To do so, we leverage the idea presented by Tunstall, Whitnall and Oswald at FSE 2013: we exhibit attacks which exploit the multiple leakages linked to one mask during the recomputation of tables. Specifically, regarding first-order table recomputation, improved by a shuffled execution, we show that there is a window of opportunity, in terms of noise variance, where a novel highly multivariate third-order attack is more efficient than a classical bivariate second-order attack. Moreover, we show on the example of the high-order secure table computation presented by Coron at EUROCRYPT 2014 that the window of opportunity enlarges linearly with the security order $d$.

Note: Like in the CHES '15 paper, but where Alg. 1 and Fig. 1 have been made compatible.

Available format(s)
Category
Implementation
Publication info
A minor revision of an IACR publication in CHES 2015
DOI
10.1007/978-3-662-48324-4_24
Contact author(s)
sylvain guilley @ telecom-paristech fr
History
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2015/837

CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2015/837,
author = {Nicolas BRUNEAU and Sylvain GUILLEY and Zakaria NAJM and Yannick TEGLIA},
title = {Multi-Variate High-Order Attacks of Shuffled Tables Recomputation},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2015/837},
year = {2015},
doi = {10.1007/978-3-662-48324-4_24},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/837}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/837}
}

Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.