Paper 2015/811
Key-recovery attacks against the MAC algorithm Chaskey
Chrysanthi Mavromati
Abstract
Chaskey is a Message Authentication Code (MAC) for 32-bit microcontrollers proposed by Mouha et. al at SAC 2014. Its underlying blockcipher uses an Even-Mansour construction with a permutation based on the ARX methodology. In this paper, we present key-recovery attacks against Chaskey in the single and multi-user setting. These attacks are based on recent work by Fouque, Joux and Mavromati presented at Asiacrypt 2014 on Even-Mansour based constructions. We first show a simple attack on the classical single-user setting which confirms the security properties of Chaskey. Then, we describe an attack in the multi-user setting and we recover all keys of 2^{43} users by doing 2^{43} queries per user. Finally, we show a variant of this attack where we are able to recover keys of two users in a smaller group of 2^{32} users.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. SAC 2015
- Keywords
- Message Authentication CodeCollision-based cryptanalysisARXEven-MansourChaskeyMulti-user setting
- Contact author(s)
- chrys mavromati @ gmail com
- History
- 2015-08-14: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2015/811
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2015/811,
author = {Chrysanthi Mavromati},
title = {Key-recovery attacks against the {MAC} algorithm Chaskey},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2015/811},
year = {2015},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/811}
}
