Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2015/752

On Constructing One-Way Permutations from Indistinguishability Obfuscation

Gilad Asharov and Gil Segev

Abstract: We prove that there is no black-box construction of a one-way permutation family from a one-way function and an indistinguishability obfuscator for the class of all oracle-aided circuits, where the construction is "domain invariant" (i.e., where each permutation may have its own domain, but these domains are independent of the underlying building blocks).

Following the framework of Asharov and Segev (FOCS '15), by considering indistinguishability obfuscation for oracle-aided circuits we capture the common techniques that have been used so far in constructions based on indistinguishability obfuscation. These include, in particular, non-black-box techniques such as the punctured programming approach of Sahai and Waters (STOC '14) and its variants, as well as sub-exponential security assumptions. For example, we fully capture the construction of a trapdoor permutation family from a one-way function and an indistinguishability obfuscator due to Bitansky, Paneth and Wichs (TCC '16). Their construction is not domain invariant and our result shows that this, somewhat undesirable property, is unavoidable using the common techniques.

In fact, we observe that constructions which are not domain invariant circumvent all known negative results for constructing one-way permutations based on one-way functions, starting with Rudich's seminal work (PhD thesis '88). We revisit this classic and fundamental problem, and resolve this somewhat surprising gap by ruling out all such black-box constructions -- even those that are not domain invariant.

Category / Keywords: foundations /

Original Publication (with major differences): IACR-TCC-2016

Date: received 28 Jul 2015, last revised 11 Oct 2015

Contact author: segev at cs huji ac il

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Version: 20190217:224315 (All versions of this report)

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