Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2015/751

Fast Garbling of Circuits Under Standard Assumptions

Shay Gueron and Yehuda Lindell and Ariel Nof and Benny Pinkas

Abstract: Protocols for secure computation enable mutually distrustful parties to jointly compute on their private inputs without revealing anything but the result. Over recent years, secure computation has become practical and considerable effort has been made to make it more and more efficient. A highly important tool in the design of two-party protocols is Yao's garbled circuit construction (Yao 1986), and multiple optimizations on this primitive have led to performance improvements of orders of magnitude over the last years. However, many of these improvements come at the price of making very strong assumptions on the underlying cryptographic primitives being used (e.g., that AES is secure for related keys, that it is circular secure, and even that it behaves like a random permutation when keyed with a public fixed key). The justification behind making these strong assumptions has been that otherwise it is not possible to achieve fast garbling and thus fast secure computation. In this paper, we take a step back and examine whether it is really the case that such strong assumptions are needed. We provide new methods for garbling that are secure solely under the assumption that the primitive used (e.g., AES) is a pseudorandom function. Our results show that in many cases, the penalty incurred is not significant, and so a more conservative approach to the assumptions being used can be adopted.

Category / Keywords: two-party; secure computation; garbling

Original Publication (with minor differences): ACM CCS 2015

Date: received 27 Jul 2015, last revised 14 Jun 2017

Contact author: nofdinar at gmail com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20170614:121417 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2015/751

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