Paper 2015/729
Provably-Secure Remote Memory Attestation to Prevent Heap Overflow Attacks
Alexandra Boldyreva, Taesoo Kim, Richard Lipton, and Bogdan Warinschi
Abstract
We initiate the study of provably secure remote memory attestation. We present two protocols offering various efficiency and security trade-offs that detect the presence of injected malicious code in remotely- stored heap memory. While our solutions offer protection only against a specific class of attacks, our novel formal security definitions are general enough to cover a wide range of attacks and settings, and should be useful for further research on the subject.
Note: Title change
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint. MAJOR revision.
- Keywords
- Memory attestationsecret sharing
- Contact author(s)
- csxbw @ bristol ac uk
- History
- 2015-12-29: last of 2 revisions
- 2015-07-21: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2015/729
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2015/729,
author = {Alexandra Boldyreva and Taesoo Kim and Richard Lipton and Bogdan Warinschi},
title = {Provably-Secure Remote Memory Attestation to Prevent Heap Overflow Attacks},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2015/729},
year = {2015},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/729}
}
