Paper 2015/729

Provably-Secure Remote Memory Attestation to Prevent Heap Overflow Attacks

Alexandra Boldyreva, Taesoo Kim, Richard Lipton, and Bogdan Warinschi

Abstract

We initiate the study of provably secure remote memory attestation. We present two protocols offering various efficiency and security trade-offs that detect the presence of injected malicious code in remotely- stored heap memory. While our solutions offer protection only against a specific class of attacks, our novel formal security definitions are general enough to cover a wide range of attacks and settings, and should be useful for further research on the subject.

Note: Title change

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint. MAJOR revision.
Keywords
Memory attestationsecret sharing
Contact author(s)
csxbw @ bristol ac uk
History
2015-12-29: last of 2 revisions
2015-07-21: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2015/729
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2015/729,
      author = {Alexandra Boldyreva and Taesoo Kim and Richard Lipton and Bogdan Warinschi},
      title = {Provably-Secure Remote Memory Attestation to Prevent Heap Overflow Attacks},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2015/729},
      year = {2015},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/729}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/729}
}
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