Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2015/729

Provably-Secure Remote Memory Attestation to Prevent Heap Overflow Attacks

Alexandra Boldyreva and Taesoo Kim and Richard Lipton and Bogdan Warinschi

Abstract: We initiate the study of provably secure remote memory attestation. We present two protocols offering various efficiency and security trade-offs that detect the presence of injected malicious code in remotely- stored heap memory. While our solutions offer protection only against a specific class of attacks, our novel formal security definitions are general enough to cover a wide range of attacks and settings, and should be useful for further research on the subject.

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / Memory attestation, secret sharing

Date: received 20 Jul 2015, last revised 29 Dec 2015

Contact author: csxbw at bristol ac uk

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Note: Title change

Version: 20151229:200029 (All versions of this report)

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