Paper 2015/691
SpecTre: A Tiny Side-Channel Resistant Speck Core for FPGAs
Cong Chen, Mehmet Sinan Inci, Mostafa Taha, and Thomas Eisenbarth
Abstract
Emerging applications such as the Internet of Things require security solutions that are small and low cost, yet feature solid protection against a wide range of sophisticated attacks. Lightweight cryptographic schemes such as the Speck cipher that was recently proposed by the NSA aim to solve some of these challenges. However, before using Speck in any practical application, sound protection against side-channel attacks must be in place. In this work, we propose a bit-serialized implementation of Speck, to achieve minimal area footprint. We further propose a Speck core that is provably secure against first-order side-channel attacks using a threshold implementation technique which depends on secure multiparty computation. The resulting design is a tiny crypto core that provides AES-like security in under 45 slices on a low-cost Xilinx Spartan 3 FPGA. The first-order side-channel resistant version of the same core needs less than 100 slices. The security of the protected core is validated by state-of-the-art side-channel leakage detection tests.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Implementation
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- Lightweight CryptographySpeckbit-serializedthreshold implementation
- Contact author(s)
- teisenbarth @ wpi edu
- History
- 2015-07-13: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2015/691
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2015/691,
author = {Cong Chen and Mehmet Sinan Inci and Mostafa Taha and Thomas Eisenbarth},
title = {{SpecTre}: A Tiny Side-Channel Resistant Speck Core for {FPGAs}},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2015/691},
year = {2015},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/691}
}
