Paper 2015/681
ANONIZE: A Large-Scale Anonymous Survey System
Susan Hohenberger, Steven Myers, Rafael Pass, and abhi shelat
Abstract
A secure ad-hoc survey scheme enables a survey authority to independently (without any interaction) select an ad-hoc group of registered users based only on their identities (e.g., their email addresses), and create a survey where only selected users can anonymously submit exactly one response. We present a formalization of secure ad-hoc surveys and present: * an abstract provably-secure implementation based on standard cryptographic building blocks (which in particular are implied by the existence of enhanced trapdoor permutations in the CRS model); * a practical instantiation of our abstract protocol, called ANONIZE, which is provably-secure in the random oracle model based on cryptographic assumptions on groups with bilinear maps. As far as we know, ANONIZE constitutes the first implementation of a large-scale secure computation protocol (of non-trivial functionalities) that can scale to millions of users.
Note: Journal version of our Oakland 2014 paper, substantially augmented with proofs, definitions, etc.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Major revision. IEEE Security and Privacy 2014
- Keywords
- anonymous surveyaccountability
- Contact author(s)
- abhi @ virginia edu
- History
- 2015-07-07: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2015/681
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2015/681,
author = {Susan Hohenberger and Steven Myers and Rafael Pass and abhi shelat},
title = {{ANONIZE}: A Large-Scale Anonymous Survey System},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2015/681},
year = {2015},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/681}
}
