Paper 2015/629

BeleniosRF: A Non-interactive Receipt-Free Electronic Voting Scheme

Pyrros Chaidos, Véronique Cortier, Georg Fuchsbauer, and David Galindo

Abstract

We propose a new voting scheme, BeleniosRF, that offers both receipt-freeness and end-to-end verifiability. It is receipt-free in a strong sense, meaning that even dishonest voters cannot prove how they voted. We provide a game-based definition of receipt-freeness for voting protocols with non-interactive ballot casting, which we name strong receipt-freeness (sRF). To our knowledge, sRF is the first game-based definition of receipt-freeness in the literature, and it has the merit of being particularly concise and simple. Built upon the Helios protocol, BeleniosRF inherits its simplicity and does not require any anti-coercion strategy from the voters. We implement BeleniosRF and show its feasibility on a number of platforms, including desktop computers and smartphones.

Note: Major revision; main differences: -- new SRC construction, now w/o random oracles -- implementation, providing benchmarks

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Minor revision. ACM CCS 2016
Keywords
e-votingreceipt-freeness
Contact author(s)
fuchsbau @ di ens fr
History
2016-10-13: revised
2015-06-30: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2015/629
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2015/629,
      author = {Pyrros Chaidos and Véronique Cortier and Georg Fuchsbauer and David Galindo},
      title = {BeleniosRF: A Non-interactive Receipt-Free Electronic Voting Scheme},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2015/629},
      year = {2015},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/629}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/629}
}
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