Paper 2015/561
SoC it to EM: electromagnetic side-channel attacks on a complex system-on-chip
J. Longo, E. De Mulder, D. Page, and M. Tunstall
Abstract
Increased complexity in modern embedded systems has presented various important challenges with regard to side-channel attacks. In particular, it is common to deploy SoC-based target devices with high clock frequencies in security-critical scenarios; understanding how such features align with techniques more often deployed against simpler devices is vital from both destructive (i.e., attack) and constructive (i.e., evaluation and/or countermeasure) perspectives. In this paper, we investigate electromagnetic-based leakage from three different means of executing cryptographic workloads (including the general purpose ARM core, an on-chip co-processor, and the NEON core) on the AM335x SoC. Our conclusion is that addressing challenges of the type above {\em is} feasible, and that key recovery attacks can be conducted with modest resources.
Note: FULL VERSION (fixed typo).
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Publication info
- Published by the IACR in CHES 2015
- Keywords
- side-channelelectromagneticsystem-on-chipARMNEON
- Contact author(s)
- jake longo @ bristol ac uk
- History
- 2015-06-22: last of 3 revisions
- 2015-06-17: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2015/561
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2015/561,
author = {J. Longo and E. De Mulder and D. Page and M. Tunstall},
title = {{SoC} it to {EM}: electromagnetic side-channel attacks on a complex system-on-chip},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2015/561},
year = {2015},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/561}
}
