Paper 2015/561

SoC it to EM: electromagnetic side-channel attacks on a complex system-on-chip

J. Longo, E. De Mulder, D. Page, and M. Tunstall


Increased complexity in modern embedded systems has presented various important challenges with regard to side-channel attacks. In particular, it is common to deploy SoC-based target devices with high clock frequencies in security-critical scenarios; understanding how such features align with techniques more often deployed against simpler devices is vital from both destructive (i.e., attack) and constructive (i.e., evaluation and/or countermeasure) perspectives. In this paper, we investigate electromagnetic-based leakage from three different means of executing cryptographic workloads (including the general purpose ARM core, an on-chip co-processor, and the NEON core) on the AM335x SoC. Our conclusion is that addressing challenges of the type above {\em is} feasible, and that key recovery attacks can be conducted with modest resources.

Note: FULL VERSION (fixed typo).

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Published by the IACR in CHES 2015
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jake longo @ bristol ac uk
2015-06-22: last of 3 revisions
2015-06-17: received
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      author = {J.  Longo and E.  De Mulder and D.  Page and M.  Tunstall},
      title = {SoC it to EM: electromagnetic side-channel attacks on a complex system-on-chip},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2015/561},
      year = {2015},
      note = {\url{}},
      url = {}
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