Paper 2015/561

SoC it to EM: electromagnetic side-channel attacks on a complex system-on-chip

J. Longo, E. De Mulder, D. Page, and M. Tunstall

Abstract

Increased complexity in modern embedded systems has presented various important challenges with regard to side-channel attacks. In particular, it is common to deploy SoC-based target devices with high clock frequencies in security-critical scenarios; understanding how such features align with techniques more often deployed against simpler devices is vital from both destructive (i.e., attack) and constructive (i.e., evaluation and/or countermeasure) perspectives. In this paper, we investigate electromagnetic-based leakage from three different means of executing cryptographic workloads (including the general purpose ARM core, an on-chip co-processor, and the NEON core) on the AM335x SoC. Our conclusion is that addressing challenges of the type above {\em is} feasible, and that key recovery attacks can be conducted with modest resources.

Note: FULL VERSION (fixed typo).

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Publication info
Published by the IACR in CHES 2015
Keywords
side-channelelectromagneticsystem-on-chipARMNEON
Contact author(s)
jake longo @ bristol ac uk
History
2015-06-22: last of 3 revisions
2015-06-17: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2015/561
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2015/561,
      author = {J.  Longo and E.  De Mulder and D.  Page and M.  Tunstall},
      title = {SoC it to EM: electromagnetic side-channel attacks on a complex system-on-chip},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2015/561},
      year = {2015},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/561}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/561}
}
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