### Efficient Constant Round Multi-Party Computation Combining BMR and SPDZ

Yehuda Lindell, Benny Pinkas, Nigel P. Smart, and Avishay Yanai

##### Abstract

Recently, there has been huge progress in the field of concretely efficient secure computation, even while providing security in the presence of \emph{malicious adversaries}. This is especially the case in the two-party setting, where constant-round protocols exist that remain fast even over slow networks. However, in the multi-party setting, all concretely efficient fully-secure protocols, such as SPDZ, require many rounds of communication. In this paper, we present an MPC protocol that is fully-secure in the presence of malicious adversaries and for any number of corrupted parties. Our construction is based on the constant-round BMR protocol of Beaver et al., and is the first version of that protocol that is \emph{concretely} efficient for the dishonest majority case. Our protocol includes an online phase that is extremely fast and mainly consists of each party locally evaluating a garbled circuit. For the offline phase we present both a generic construction (using any underlying MPC protocol), and a highly efficient instantiation based on the SPDZ protocol. Our estimates show the protocol to be considerably more efficient than previous fully-secure multi-party protocols.

Available format(s)
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Contact author(s)
Yehuda Lindell @ biu ac il
benny @ pinkas net
nigel @ cs bris ac uk
ay yanay @ gmail com
History
2017-12-19: last of 5 revisions
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2015/523

CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2015/523,
author = {Yehuda Lindell and Benny Pinkas and Nigel P.  Smart and Avishay Yanai},
title = {Efficient Constant Round Multi-Party Computation Combining BMR and SPDZ},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2015/523},
year = {2015},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/523}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/523}
}

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