Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2015/506

Strong Non-Interference and Type-Directed Higher-Order Masking

Gilles Barthe and Sonia Belaïd and François Dupressoir and Pierre-Alain Fouque and Benjamin Grégoire and Pierre-Yves Strub and Rébecca Zucchini

Abstract: Differential power analysis (DPA) is a side-channel attack in which an adversary retrieves cryptographic material by measuring and analyzing the power consumption of the device on which the cryptographic algorithm under attack executes. An effective countermeasure against DPA is to mask secrets by probabilistically encoding them over a set of shares, and to run masked algorithms that compute on these encodings. Masked algorithms are often expected to provide, at least, a certain level of probing security. Leveraging the deep connections between probabilistic information flow and probing security, we develop a precise, scalable, and fully automated methodology to verify the probing security of masked algorithms, and generate them from unprotected descriptions of the algorithm. Our methodology relies on several contributions of independent interest, including a stronger notion of probing security that supports compositional reasoning, and a type system for enforcing an expressive class of probing policies. Finally, we validate our methodology on examples that go significantly beyond the state-of-the-art.

Category / Keywords: secret-key cryptography, masking, composition, formal methods, compiler, type system

Original Publication (with major differences): Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security

Date: received 27 May 2015, last revised 25 Oct 2016

Contact author: masking at projects easycrypt info

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Note: Extended version of the published article after major rewriting.

Version: 20161025:212137 (All versions of this report)

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